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Abstract
We study the implications of selling through a voice-based virtual assistant. The seller has a
set of products available and the virtual assistant dynamically decides which product to offer
in each sequential interaction and at what price. The virtual assistant may maximize the
seller’s profits; it may be altruistic, maximizing total surplus; or it may serve as a consumer
agent maximizing the consumer surplus. The consumer is impatient and rational, seeking to
maximize her expected utility given the information available to her. The virtual assistant
selects products based on the consumer’s request and other information available to it (e.g.,
consumer profile information) and presents them sequentially. Once a product is presented and
priced, the consumer evaluates it and decides whether to make a purchase. The consumer’s
valuation of each product comprises a pre-evaluation value, which is common knowledge to the
consumer and the virtual assistant, and a post-evaluation component which is private to the
consumer. We solve for the equilibria and develop efficient algorithms for implementing the
solution. In the special case where the private information is exponentially distributed, the
profit-maximizing total surplus is distributed equally between the consumer and the seller, and
the profit-maximizing ranking also maximizes the consumer surplus. We examine the effects of
information asymmetry on the outcomes and study how incentive misalignment depends on the
distribution of private valuations. We find that monotone rankings are optimal in the cases of
a highly patient or impatient consumer and provide a good approximation for other levels of
patience. The relationship between products’ expected valuations and prices depends on the
consumer’s patience level and is monotone increasing (decreasing) when the consumer is highly
impatient (patient). Also, the seller’s share of total surplus decreases in the amount of private
information. We compare the virtual assistant to a traditional web-based interface, where
multiple products are presented simultaneously on each page. We find that within a page, the
higher-value products are priced lower than the lower-value product when the private valuations
are exponentially distributed. This is because increasing one product’s valuation increases the
matching probability of the other products on the same page, which in turn increases their prices
of other products. Finally, the web-based interface generally achieves higher profits for the seller
than a virtual assistant due to the greater commitment power inherent in its presentation.
1 Introduction
Electronic communication and commerce are in the early stages of a transition from the web
and app eras, which were based on a screen- and keyboard-based user interface, to the use of
natural language, primarily in the form of voice interfaces that are natural, fast and convenient for
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consumers. With speech recognition reaching the point where natural language can be interpreted
correctly more than 95% of the time, most of today’s operating systems come with voice interactivity
across multiple devices ranging from phones and laptops to smart speakers and TVs. Amazon’s Echo
family, Google Home and Alibaba’s Tmall Genie are examples of virtual assistant (VA) devices,
and Amazon’s Alexa, Google’s Assistant, Microsoft’s Cortana and Apple’s Siri are examples of
voice-based user interfaces. The U.S. household penetration of VA devices was 32% in 2019 and it
is expected to increase to 51% by 2022 (Tiwari et al. (2019)). Further, these devices are expected to
be integrated into cars, home electronics and consumer electronics devices that can be connected to
platforms such as Amazon’s Alexa. These new devices and interfaces offer a new way for consumers
to access online information and increasingly, to engage in commerce. While the use of virtual
assistants in electronic commerce is still in its infancy, it promises to become an important gateway
to the marketplaces of the future, with more than sixty percent of marketers being optimistic about
voice commerce compared to 11% who are pessimistic (Voicebot.ai (2019b)).
JuniperResearch (2020) estimated that there were more than 4 billion digital voice assistants
worldwide in 2000, a number it expected to increase to 8.4 billion by 2024 due to the introduction
of voice assistants in new devices including wearables, smart home, and TV devices. Voicebot.ai’s
Smart Speaker Consumer Adoption reports found that 15% of U.S. smart speaker owners made
purchases by voice on a monthly basis in 2018, up from 13.6% in 2017 (Voicebot.ai (2019a), p. 17).
Moreover, 20% of consumers already shopped using smart speakers, and 44% would make new or
additional purchases if the interface was supported by more brands in 2019 (Adobe (2019)).
The voice interface offers speed and convenience but it also changes the nature of the interaction
between the consumer and the marketplace. When using a virtual assistant, instead of searching
and browsing a list of products within a page, the consumer uses natural language to specify what
she is looking for and the virtual assistant presents products one by one through voice, based on the
consumer’s requirements and other information. If the consumer rejects the first offer, the virtual
assistant presents the next product, and so on. Thus, unlike traditional online channels where the
consumer is largely in control of the search process, the sequential nature of voice response gives
the virtual assistant a greater degree of control.
In this paper we study the implications of these new interfaces for product sales. We consider
a seller with a set of products available for sale. The VA decides which product to offer in each
sequential interaction and at what price to maximize the seller’s expected profit, the total sur-
plus or the consumer surplus. The consumer is rational, seeking to maximize her expected utility
given the information available to her. The consumer has a limited attention span. If the con-
sumer’s search time exceeds her attention span, she leaves the market without making a purchase.
When the consumer is active, the VA selects products and presents them to the consumer one by
one. Once a product is presented to the consumer, she takes some time to evaluate it and decide
whether to make a purchase. The consumer’s valuation of each product comprises two parts: a
pre-evaluation component which is common knowledge to the consumer and the VA, and a post-
evaluation component which is private to the consumer. Based on a comparison of value and price,
the consumer decides whether to buy the current product or request another product, taking into
account upcoming product opportunities as well as her limited purchase window.
We first solve for the equilibria obtained when the consumer maximizes her expected utility and
the VA maximizes the seller’s expected profit. We find efficient algorithms for solving the problem
and compare them to the optimal results. We examine the effects of information asymmetries
on the outcomes—pricing, ranking and surplus allocation. We consider the effects of incentive
misalignment and find the equilibrium results for an altruistic VA (which maximizes the total
surplus) and a consumer agent (which maximizes the consumer surplus). We study the effects
of the distribution of private valuations and then compare the virtual assistant to a traditional
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web-based interface, where multiple products are presented simultaneously on each page. We find
that the platform’s surplus share is higher for the web-based interface. We also obtain closed-form
results for the case where the private valuations are exponentially-distributed.
1.1 Literature review
Although the use of VAs in shopping is still an emerging phenomenon, the academic literature (e.g.,
Kumar et al. (2016), Rzepka et al. (2020)) agrees with practitioners on its disruptive potential and
expected growth. This literature is largely empirical or descriptive, focusing on the adoption,
benefits and implications of VAs. Kumar et al. (2016) provide a taxonomy of intelligent agent
technologies as well as a framework for studying their adoption. Nasirian et al. (2017) study the
drivers of VA adoption by consumers, identifying interaction quality as a key driver of trust which
(together with personal innovativeness) influences the intention to use a VA. Sun et al. (2019)
provide a comprehensive analysis of data from Alibaba’s VA, TMall Genie, showing that the VA
increases shopper engagement and purchase levels. They distinguish between the effect of VAs on
purchase quantity, which is pronounced for high-income, younger, and more active consumers, and
the effect on spending amount, which is larger for low-income, younger, and less active consumers.
Several papers discuss both the benefits and limitations of VAs. Rzepka et al. (2020) examine
the benefits and costs that users expect and obtain from voice commerce through semi-structured
interviews with Amazon Alexa users. They identify convenience, efficiency and enjoyment as key
perceived benefits and limited transparency, lack of trust and technical immaturity as perceived
shortcomings. Jones (2018) uses a case study approach to illustrate these tradeoffs and their
implications for consumers and marketers. She points out the challenges associated with consumers’
loss of control and privacy. Kraus et al. (2019) study factors that influence consumer satisfaction in
voice commerce vs. e-commerce. They find that convenience is a key driver of satisfaction for both
e-commerce and voice commerce, with a larger impact on the latter. They also bring a cognitive
information processing perspective (Davern et al. (2012)) to the analysis, with the lower richness
of voice commerce requiring a larger cognitive effort than for e-commerce. Mari (2019) and Mari
et al. (2020) use interviews with brand owners and AI experts, coupled with an analysis of the
functional characteristics of VAs, to study the implications of the technology for consumers and
brands. They identify the importance of ranking algorithms, finding that “the virtual assistant
may reduce consumers’ visibility of product alternatives and increase brand polarization. In this
context, product ranking algorithms on virtual assistants assume an even more critical role than
in other consumer applications” (p.8), as the sequential nature of choice limits visibility, product
alternatives and consumer choice. Similar limitations are also discussed in Rzepka et al. (2020) and
Jones (2018). One of our objectives in this paper is to study theoretically the implications of the
ranking effect in light of the limitations of the technology.
The limitations of buying through a VA are due to two factors. First, choices are made se-
quentially, which significantly limits consumers’ ability to recall earlier options and make direct
comparisons with them. Second, the voice interface is more limited than visual interfaces, which
increases consumers’ cognitive effort and again limits choice. Both drivers have an adverse effect
on consumers as they increase cognitive load. Basu and Savani (2019) and the papers they sur-
vey compare the effects of simultaneous and sequential presentation on consumer behavior. This
literature shows that in general, sequential presentation results in inferior decisions compared to
simultaneous presentation. Viewing options sequentially makes it difficult to properly compare the
current choice to previous ones, whereas simultaneous presentation allows comprehensive compar-
isons. Kraus et al. (2019) review the literature on the adverse effects of voice commerce due to
the cognitive limitations of the auditory interface. Munz and Morwitz (2019) show through six
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experiments that information presented by voice is more difficult to process than the same infor-
mation presented visually. As a result of these cognitive difficulties, consumers tend not to recall
the earlier options they have reviewed. Indeed, research in psychology and consumer behavior finds
in multiple settings that consumers sampling products sequentially are often likely to choose the
last product presented to them (e.g., de Bruin and Keren (2003), Bullard et al. (2017)). Biswas
et al. (2014) argue that when consumers sample sensory-rich products, they may choose the first
or the last product sampled depending on the degree of similarity across sensory cues. We expect
that in the case of a VA, where the consumer decides when to stop searching, she is even more
likely to select the last product considered when making a purchase.
The existing VA literature is largely empirical. As researchers (e.g., Mari (2019), Mari et al.
(2020)) have noted, “providing structure and guidance to researchers and marketers in order to
further explore this emerging stream of research (VA) is fundamental” (p.8). In this paper, we aim
to narrow the gap between theory and practice by modeling the VA buying process, determining
how a VA should price and rank products to maximize alternative objective functions given rational
consumer choice, studying the implications of the resulting equilibria, and comparing the outcomes
obtained through a VA to those obtained from a web interface.
Analytically, our model shares some aspects (in particular, consumer impatience) with Izhutov
and Mendelson (2018), who consider a two-sided marketplace for services such as tutoring and derive
pricing algorithms to maximize social surplus or seller profits. In Izhutov and Mendelson (2018),
the seller can only control prices (there is no ranking problem) and consumer behavior is exogenous.
In contrast, our model studies a VA selling physical products and controlling both the prices and
the order of presentation to the consumer. Our optimization problem is also analytically related to
the retail assortment planning problem in the Operations Management literature. This literature
may be classified into three overlapping groups: (i) traditional assortment planning analysis with
no ranking effect, which is more foundational in nature; (ii) ranking through an auction or similar
means, where an intermediary platform designs a mechanism that ranks offers based on suppliers’
bids or similar information signals; and (iii) more complex (mostly two-stage) models of assortment
ranking.
The traditional assortment planning literature (group (i)) derives algorithms to compute the
optimal assortment for a retail operation. The problem may be addressed in either static or dynamic
setting. Ko¨k et al. (2008) provide an extensive review of the static assortment planning literature.
Mahajan and Van Ryzin (2001) and Honhon et al. (2010) study the optimal assortment when
consumers can only choose among the products that are still in stock. Golrezaei et al. (2014) and
Bernstein et al. (2015) consider the problem of dynamically customizing assortment offerings based
on the preferences of each consumer and the remaining product inventories. Motivated by fast
fashion operations, Caro et al. (2014) study how to release products from a fixed set into stores
over multiple periods, taking into account the decay in product attractiveness once presented in the
store. Davis et al. (2015) study the assortment planning problem for a seller that sequentially adds
products to its assortment over time, thereby monotonically increasing consumers’ consideration
sets. In this setting, the profit margin is exogenously given and the consumer is myopic. Davis et al.
(2015) derive an approximation algorithm that achieves at least (1− 1/e) of the optimal revenue.
Saban and Weintraub (2019) consider the mechanism design problem for a procurement agency
that selects suppliers or product assortments made available to consumers. Suppliers may compete
for the market (entry/assortment competition) and in the market (price competition within the
assortment). They characterize the optimal buying mechanisms, showing how restricting the entry
of close substitutes may increase price competition and consumer surplus.
Ferreira and Goh (2019) introduce information effects to the assortment planning literature,
considering the impact of concealing products which are in the full product catalog from consumers
4
in an attempt to induce them to buy additional products later. They compare the case where the
seller presents the entire assortment for the entire selling season (similar to a traditional department
store or a web-based catalog) to the case where the seller intentionally introduces products one at a
time (fast-fashion being a canonical example). The difference between the seller’s expected profits
in the latter vs. the former case is the value of concealment. When consumers are non-anticipating
(i.e., make decisions a period at a time ignoring the future), the retailer successfully induces them
to buy more products, which increases its profit. When consumers are strategic and anticipate the
retailer’s future actions, the value of concealment is ambiguous. While most of the paper focuses on
the value of concealment for a given ranking and assortment, (Ferreira and Goh (2019), Corollary
1 and 2) also show that under a special set of circumstances, the seller will induce the consumer
to buy more by concealing the more valuable products so she will buy them later. This happens
when the consumer is non-anticipating and either (i) the prices (assumed exogenous throughout
the paper) are the same and the valuation distributions follow a stochastic dominance relationship,
or (ii) the valuations have the same distribution which has an increasing failure rate. Ferreira and
Goh (2019) thus provide a nice model of information disclosure as a tool sellers can manipulate to
their advantage.
As discussed above, the product ranking decision is particularly important when selling through
a VA (cf. Mari (2019), Mari et al. (2020)). This problem may be related to the vast literature
studying how a search engine should rank paid ads. These models are typically three-sided, involv-
ing consumers, advertisers and the search engine, and they focus on a tradeoff between relevance
and revenue (see, e.g, Agrawal et al. (2020) for a review). l’Ecuyer et al. (2017) bring this tradeoff
to the assortment planning domain considering multiple sellers selling one item each through a
platform. l’Ecuyer et al. (2017) summarize the behavior of consumers using a click-through rate
function that represents the purchase probability of each item as a function of its position and
intrinsic characteristics. The platform maximizes expected revenue by calculating for each item a
score that balances its revenue and relevance and ranking them by decreasing scores. Chu et al.
(2020) study a three-sided market involving a consumer and multiple suppliers with a platform
in-between. The platform’s objective is to maximize a weighted average of the suppliers’ surplus,
consumer surplus, and platform revenue. They study a position auction (in the spirit of search en-
gine position auctions) to sell the first k available slots to n suppliers. They rank suppliers based on
a surplus-ordered ranking (SOR) mechanism that considers suppliers’ contributions to the objective
function (realized for the first k and expected for the remaining suppliers), and show numerically
that this mechanism is near-optimal. From the consumers’ point of view, products are ex-ante
homogeneous, which allows Chu et al. (2020) to show that, in a simpler setup with no auction, the
platform’s optimal ranking is based on realized SOR with full information and expected SOR with
no information.
Ranking decisions may be made by the consumer, by the seller, or by some combination of the
two. The classic framework for ranking by the consumer is due to Weitzman (1979), who proposes
an elegant solution to a consumer choice model he calls “Pandora’s Box”: a consumer faces N closed
boxes, where box i has a prize whose (unknown) value comes from a known distribution, and the
cost to open box i is ci. The consumer has to decide in what order to open and inspect the boxes (to
learn the realized value of the prize inside), and when to stop opening and take home the best prize,
allowing perfect recall. The solution ranks boxes by a reservation price index, with the consumer
stopping when the maximum sampled reward exceeds the reservation price of every remaining closed
box. A few papers in the assortment planning literature use the idea of a two-stage consumer choice
process, where the consumer first forms a consideration set in the spirit of Weitzman (1979), and in
the second stage selects the product within that consideration set. This is an effective model for a
web-based seller but not for a VA, where the order of inspections is determined by the VA, not by
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the consumer. Wang and Sahin (2018) study assortment planning and pricing where the consumer
follows a two-stage model with homogeneous search costs. The consumer includes products in her
consideration set by comparing their incremental net utility to the search cost. In the second stage,
the consumer uses the Multinomial Logistic (MNL) model (assuming Gumbel random valuations)
to select from the consideration set. Wang and Sahin (2018) develop an algorithm to calculate the
optimal assortment and prices. They find that without a search cost, all products have the same
price—a consequence of the MNL assumption. Derakhshan et al. (2018) develop a two-stage model
with heterogeneous search costs which are increasing in the item’s position. Prices are exogenous
and consumers follow a process similar in spirit to Weitzman (1979) to form a consideration set.
The final choice is then made following an MNL choice model similar to Wang and Sahin (2018).
They show that the problem is NP hard and propose a polynomial-time solution algorithm. They
find that even though ranking products in descending order of intrinsic utilities is suboptimal, it
achieves a multiplicative approximation factor of 1/2 and an additive factor of 0.17.
The web-interface model developed by Gallego et al. (2018) also adopts the two-stage consumer
choice approach: the consumer first forms a consideration set (all products in the first k pages)
according to her type (which determines k) and then follows the MNL model to select a product
within the consideration set. The seller knows the distribution of consumer types and maximizes
its expected revenue over rankings and prices. Gallego et al. (2018) recommend a descending
ranking in value gaps (net utilities when products are sold at their unit wholesale costs). They
show that the price markups are the same for all products on the same page, and are increasing
in the page index. Aouad et al. (2015) propose a two-stage model outside the Weitzman (1979)
setup. Instead, different consumer types have exogenous consideration sets and product preferences,
and the platform determines the overall assortment from which consumers select their preferred
product. Aouad et al. (2015) formulate the problem as one of maximizing expected revenue over a
graph and derive a recursive algorithm for solving it.
To our knowledge, our model is the first that combines optimal ranking and pricing decisions by
a seller under strategic consumer choice in the setting of a VA. Because of our different objectives,
both our model structure and our results are significantly different from those in the assortment
optimization literature. Relative to the traditional assortment planning literature, these differences
are obvious, as our model is designed to jointly determine the optimal ranking and pricing for
the particular setting of a VA. This is why ranking and presentation are at the core of our model
as opposed to most traditional assortment planning models (group (i) in our classification of the
literature). In contrast to the myopic consumer assumed in most traditional models, we model
a rational, forward-looking consumer. As a result, the temporal dynamics are the equilibrium
outcome of the interactions between the seller and the consumer, unlike traditional (group (i))
assortment planning models where the dynamics are driven by the seller’s inventory level. These
and other differences are to be expected as this literature was not designed to address the issues
we focus on in this paper.
Our model is closer in structure to those of l’Ecuyer et al. (2017), Chu et al. (2020), Wang
and Sahin (2018), Derakhshan et al. (2018), Gallego et al. (2018), Aouad et al. (2015) and Ferreira
and Goh (2019), which we reviewed above. The key differences between these models and ours are
summarized below.
1. Pricing. Most (but not all) of the above papers focus on assortment planning per se and
therefore take product prices as given (Ferreira and Goh (2019), l’Ecuyer et al. (2017), Chu
et al. (2020) Derakhshan et al. (2018), Aouad et al. (2015)), or use the MNL assumption
(Wang and Sahin (2018) Gallego et al. (2018)). As is well-known, the MNL assumption
greatly simplifies the price optimization problem, however it is restrictive and is designed to
6
lead to the same price or margin for all products (Anderson et al. (1992)). Indeed, Gallego
et al. (2018) find the same price margin within a same page and Wang and Sahin (2018) find
the same price for all except possibly one product. In our setting, the seller has two levers
at hand, pricing and ranking, and our model allows it to take full advantage of both, which
enables us to derive key insights on their interaction and impact.
2. Consumer choice and ranking model. The literature covers multiple consumer choice
and ranking models, all of which significantly differ from ours. Wang and Sahin (2018) and
Aouad et al. (2015) differ from Derakhshan et al. (2018) in that the former focus on two-stage
assortment optimization without an actual position (i.e., ranking) effect whereas the latter
considers position-dependent consumer search costs. In all three papers, the consumer has
the freedom to choose which product to review—an appropriate structure for a store or a
web-based seller, but not for a VA, where the VA, rather than the consumer, makes this
choice. In Gallego et al. (2018)’s two-stage model, the consumer views all the products in the
first few pages without deciding when to stop, as the consumer type determines the number
of pages (and products) she views. Similar to Derakhshan et al. (2018) and Wang and Sahin
(2018) and unlike our setting, the final choice is made by the consumer based on the MNL
choice model. l’Ecuyer et al. (2017) and Chu et al. (2020) model a platform in the spirit
of the search engine literature, with the consumer choice problem not being influenced by
the platform’s strategy, or being modeled indirectly. Chu et al. (2020)’s three-sided model
involves a platform, suppliers and consumers. The consumer’s decisions need not depend on
the platform’s ranking strategy as all products are ex-ante homogeneous from the consumer’s
point of view. l’Ecuyer et al. (2017) model the consumer choice problem indirectly through a
click-through-rate function that combines the effects of position and product characteristics.
Unlike the foregoing papers, Ferreira and Goh (2019) consider information strategies designed
to increase the number of units bought by a consumer over a selling season. For the most part,
they consider the implications of a given ranking and assortment on the value of concealment.
Two of their Corollaries show show that under a special set of circumstances, a particular rank-
ing (ascending order in product valuations) is optimal. The consumer choice model leading
to this result is entirely different from ours (an infinitely patient non-anticipating consumer
buying multiple units) as are the assumptions (same prices or same valuation distributions)
and results, differences which are driven by their different objective (to study the value of
concealment).
3. Recall. All the above papers assume that consumers have perfect recall. Whereas this
assumption is reasonable for a traditional web-interface (at the page level), as discussed
above, choice under a sequential presentation (especially with a voice interface, which further
increases cognitive load) is better characterized by no recall. It will be interesting to examine
the effects of imperfect recall, which covers both assumptions as special cases, in future work.
4. Comparison of VA to web interface. An important issue studied in our paper is the
comparison between selling through a web interface and selling through a VA. Naturally, the
papers cited above were not designed to provide such a comparison.
The differences between the objectives and modeling choices of our paper vis-a-vis the foregoing
papers also drive key differences in the results:
1. Optimal pricing. Most of the above papers take prices as given, Wang and Sahin (2018)
and Gallego et al. (2018) being the exceptions. The MNL consumer choice model used in
7
both papers naturally gives rise to pricing results that are significantly different from ours.
Wang and Sahin (2018) find that either all products are priced the same, similar to the MNL
literature, or all but one product are priced the same (the lowest value product may be priced
differently so it will enter the consideration set without affecting the prices of higher-valued
products). Gallego et al. (2018) find that with a web interface, all products within each page
have the same price margin, a result which is mainly driven by the MNL assumption. In
contrast, we find—for our web interface model—the counter-intuitive result that within a
page, prices are typically decreasing in product valuations (or margins), which means that
higher-valued products tend to have a lower price. Higher-valued products are priced lower to
increase the matching probability of the entire page, thus allowing lower-valued products to
set a higher price. This insight does not apply to Gallego et al. (2018)’s model, where a given
consumer can simultaneously inspect all products on the pages she has access to. Gallego
et al. (2018) also find that across web pages, the price margin is increasing in the page index.
In contrast, we find that the reverse may also happen depending on problem parameters such
as the amount of private information and the consumer patience level.
2. Optimal ranking. Among the papers where the seller solves a ranking problem, one suggests
an approximation algorithm with performance guarantees (Derakhshan et al. (2018)), and
two characterize the optimal results (Chu et al. (2020), l’Ecuyer et al. (2017)). Derakhshan
et al. (2018) develop an approximate ranking algorithm and show that the intuitive ranking
(descending in product utility), though not optimal, has a performance guarantee. In Chu
et al. (2020), the optimal ranking is descending in the product’s contribution to the platform’s
(weighted) objective function. In l’Ecuyer et al. (2017), the optimal ranking is decreasing in
product scores that summarize each product’s contribution to expected revenue. In all three
papers, products are ranked by a decreasing score that quantifies their contribution to the
objective function. Due to the flexibility of our model, we find the optimal ranking may be an
arbitrary permutation of the available products depending on the consumer patience level and
other problem parameters. Further, under certain conditions the optimal ranking is actually
increasing in product valuations. Wang and Sahin (2018) and Aouad et al. (2015) consider
the case where the seller provides an assortment to the consumer, and the consumer ranks the
products to form a consideration set and then selects the best item within the consideration
set. The optimal ranking in their model is descending in the consumer utility (Wang and
Sahin (2018)) or in the consumer’s preference list (Aouad et al. (2018)). In our paper, the
optimal ranking for a profit-maximizing seller is highly-dependent on the consumer’s patience
level. In particular, the optimal ranking is descending in valuations for a highly-impatient
consumer and ascending in valuations for a sufficiently patient consumer. This is intertwined
with our model’s pricing decisions: an ascending order, for example, allows the seller to
induce the consumer to stay and pay a higher price for lower-ranked products. This strategy,
however, can work only when the consumer is sufficiently patient. Even for a consumer agent
that maximizes consumer surplus, the optimal ranking is still ascending in valuations when
the consumer is patient as the consumer benefits from viewing more products.
3. Comparison of alternative objective functions. Most of the above papers (Ferreira and
Goh (2019), l’Ecuyer et al. (2017), Gallego et al. (2018), Aouad et al. (2015), Ferreira and
Goh (2019)) consider a profit- (or revenue-)maximizing seller or platform, Chu et al. (2020)
and Derakhshan et al. (2018) being the exceptions. Chu et al. (2020)’s objective function is a
weighted average of the platform revenue, supplier surplus and consumer surplus. They find
that the optimal ranking for a profit-maximizing platform is descending in product prices;
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for maximizing supplier surplus, it is descending in the seller valuations; and for maximizing
consumer surplus, it is descending in the consumer’s utility. Derakhshan et al. (2018) also
develop an algorithm for maximizing consumer welfare. Both papers provide algorithms to
approximate the optimal ranking and, unlike our paper, do not focus on structural differences
in the results obtained under alternative objective functions. In our paper, we study the
differences in surplus allocations and strategies for VAs that maximize seller profits, overall
surplus (an altruistic VA) or consumer surplus (a consumer agent). Our specification allows
us to study how the surplus allocation depends on the distribution of the private signals
and on the consumer’s patience level. Interestingly, when the private valuation distribution
is exponential, a profit-maximizing seller always extracts half the total surplus. We also
find that the seller makes zero profit when the VA is altruistic or acts as a consumer agent.
Again, unlike Chu et al. (2020) and Derakhshan et al. (2018), we can also study the effect
on product prices. We find that an altruistic seller (maximizing total surplus) follows exactly
the same ranking and pricing strategy as a consumer agent. The strategies of a a seller-
profit-maximizing VA reflect its market power and its ability to manipulate the presentation
to its advantage. Nevertheless, for both highly patient and highly impatient consumers and
exponentially-distributed private valuations, the optimal rankings under all three objective
functions are the same.
1.2 Paper Overview
The plan of the paper is as follows. Following this Introduction, Section 2 presents our model. The
pricing problem for a given ranking is solved in Section 3. Section 4 addresses the optimal ranking.
Section 5 discusses the implications of using a VA, Section 6 compares the VA to a traditional
web-interface and Section7 offers our concluding remarks.
2 Model
We consider a virtual assistant serving a seller that sequentially offers products to consumers and
prices them dynamically. The seller (through the VA) selects from N products i = 1, 2, · · · , N that
are available for sale, presenting and pricing them one at a time. When the seller sells product
i, it incurs a cost ci which includes payments to the vendor, logistics and shipping (if applicable)
costs, etc., and it pockets the difference between the price it charges, pi, and its cost ci. An
arriving consumer specifies what she is looking for and the VA then presents the available products
sequentially at its discretion. When a product i is presented, the seller prices it dynamically at pi
based on the information available to it. The consumer evaluates the product and decides whether
to buy it or move on to the next product (in which case product i becomes unavailable). Each
product presentation and evaluation lasts an exponential amount of time with rate τp and expected
value 1/τp. The consumer’s overall search lasts for an exponential amount of time with rate τc and
expected value 1/τc. The consumer leaves the system following this search time or after she exhausts
all N available products without making a purchase. All of the evaluation and search times are
independent. We denote by ρ = τpτp+τc the consumer’s patience parameter—the probability that for
a given product, the consumer’s evaluation is completed before she leaves the system (so she can
buy it if she chooses to). The seller uses the VA to rank and dynamically price each product so as
to maximize its expected profit. With this objective function, the VA is subservient to the seller.
We also consider other objectives (maximizing total surplus and maximizing consumer surplus) in
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Section 3.2. As consumers arrive sequentially, we can perform the analysis for one consumer at a
time.
When a consumer arrives, she provides information about the product she is looking for (e.g.,
in the form of a search query). This information, along with consumer profile information, is
converted by the seller to an estimated base valuation vi for each product i. Once the consumer
has evaluated a product presented to her, she values the product at vi + i, where i is the private
information unobservable by the seller. When product i is priced at pi, the consumer’s net utility
from purchasing it is thus ui = vi − pi + i. We assume the i are i.i.d. random variables sampled
from a common distribution F (·) with positive support.
The consumer aims to maximize her expected net utility. We show later that in equilibrium, the
consumer will buy product i if and only if its net utility ui is above a threshold level that balances
the net utility of product i against the opportunity to buy a product yielding a higher net utility in
the future. We call this form of consumer policy “threshold policy”. For simplicity, we assume no
discounting (as is well known, a discount factor may be incorporated in τc). If product i were sold
at cost, its value to the consumer would be vi + E()− ci. We call vi + E()− ci the value margin
of product i(i = 1, 2, . . . , N) and assume for simplicity that the (vi − ci) are non-positive and  is
positively-supported.
In summary, the seller decides on a product ranking and dynamic pricing policy to maximize
its objective function knowing all vi, ci (i = 1, 2, · · · , N) and which products have been rejected by
the consumer. The consumer dynamically decides on whether to accept or reject each offer, and
the process continues until the consumer departs. Our notation is summarized in appendix A.
2.1 Strategies and equilibrium
Each party (the seller and the consumer) hold beliefs about the other’s strategy, and each optimizes
its own objective function taking the other’s strategy as given. In equilibrium, these beliefs are
consistent. The seller’s strategy is defined by two n-dimensional vectors:
(i) a permutation σ = (σ1, · · · , σN ) specifying the ranking of products for presentation by the
seller, and
(ii) a price vector p = (pσ1 , · · · , pσN ) specifying the price assigned by the seller to each product.
The consumer’s strategy is defined as a mapping from the history up to time t, Ht, to {accept, reject}.
In equilibrium,
(i) given the price p and ranking σ, the consumer’s acceptance strategy at each time t is optimal;
and
(ii) given the consumer’s strategy, the rank-price combination (σ,p) maximizes the seller’s ob-
jective function.
Next, we show that in equilibrium, the consumer’s optimal strategy must have the threshold pol-
icy structure. Assume, without loss of generality, that for a given seller strategy (σ,p), σ =
(1, 2, · · · , N) by renumbering the products. Let V ci (i) be the expected consumer utility from
round i until the consumer departs (possibly purchasing a product) when she observes a private
value of i. Let V ci = EV ci (i) where the expectation is taken over i. Then, if the consumer decides
to buy in round i, she’ll get vi–pi + i. Otherwise, the consumer waits for the next round and
receives an expected utility of ρV ci+1. It follows that
V ci (i) = max{vi–pi + i, ρV ci+1}.
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The consumer will purchase in round i if and only if ui = vi–pi + i ≥ ρV ci+1. Thus, the consumer
will choose a threshold policy: ui ≥ δi := ρV ci+1, where δi is the consumer’s optimal threshold in
round i. We have:
Proposition 2.1 (Consumer threshold policy). For any given (σ,p), the consumer’s best
response is a threshold policy δ.
An equilibrium is thus defined by three n-dimensional vectors (δ,σ,p) such that:
δ maximizes E[V c(δ,σ,p)] , and (1)
(σ,p) maximizes E[V p(δ,σ,p)], (2)
where V p (V c) is the expected seller (consumer) surplus.
3 Equilibrium pricing
We first solve the profit-maximizing pricing problem for a given ranking σ, where the i.i.d. private
valuations i follow a general distribution F . We then consider the special case where they are
exponentially distributed. In section 3.2, we examine what happens under alternative objective
functions.
3.1 Pricing for profit maximization
For a given ranking σ (assuming, without loss of generality, σ = (1, 2, · · · , N)), the equilibrium
prices and the consumer’s optimal thresholds can be calculated by backward induction, yielding
the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1 (Profit-maximization for a given ranking with  ∼ F (·)). Given σ =
(1, 2, · · · , N), the equilibrium (δ,p) satisfies the following recursion:
(a) In stage N ,
The consumer’s threshold is δN = 0.
The equilibrium price at stage N is given by
p∗N = arg maxp PN (p− cN ),
and the equilibrium probability of purchase is given by
PN = 1− F (p∗N − vN ).
Under the optimal price, the seller’s expected profit in period N is given by
V pN = PN (p
∗
N − cN ),
and the consumer’s expected surplus in period N is given by
V cN = PNE(N + vN − p∗N |N + vN − p∗N ≥ δN ).
(b) In stage i = N − 1, · · · , 1,
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The consumer’s threshold is δi = ρV ci+1.
The equilibrium price in stage i is given by
p∗i = arg maxp Pi(p− ci) + (1− Pi)ρV
p
i+1,
and the probability of purchase is given by
Pi = 1− F (p∗i − vi + ρV ci+1).
Under the optimal price, the seller’s expected profit in period i is given by
V pi = Pi(p∗i − ci) + (1− Pi)ρV pi+1,
and the consumer’s expected surplus in period i is given by
V ci = PiE(i + vi − p∗i |i + vi − p∗i ≥ δi) + (1− Pi)ρV ci+1.
In the special case where the private valuations are exponentially distributed, Proposition 3.1
simplifies to:
Corollary 3.2 (Profit-maximization: Equilibrium for a given ranking with  ∼ exp(α)).
Given σ = (1, 2, · · · , N), the equilibrium (δ,p) satisfies the following recursion:
(a) In stage N ,
The consumer’s threshold is δN = 0, the equilibrium price is
p∗N = cN +
1
α
,
and the probability of purchase is given by
PN = exp(α(vN − cN )− 1).
Under the optimal price, the seller’s expected profit and the consumer’s expected surplus
are both given by
V pN = V
c
N =
1
α
exp(α(vN − cN )− 1) = 1
α
PN
(b) At stage i = N − 1, . . . , 1,
The consumer’s threshold is δi = ρV ci+1,
The optimal price is
p∗i = ci +
1
α
+ ρV pi+1,
and the probability of purchase is
Pi = exp(α(vi − ci)− 1) · exp(−αρ(2V pi+1))
Under the optimal price, the seller’s expected profit and the consumer’s expected surplus
at stage i is
V pi = V ci =
1
α
N∑
k=i
ρk−iPk.
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By Proposition 3.1, the optimal price in the last stage is the “monopoly” price that maximizes the
seller’s expected profit in the single-product case. This is because in the last stage, the seller is
effectively making a final ”take-it-or-leave-it” offer to the consumer with no continuation option.
In the exponential case (Corollary 3.2), the monopoly price in the last stage is independent of
the last product’s valuation, and the price of the product offered in each stage i is independent
of its own valuation vi – it depends only on the valuations of products i + 1, . . . N through the
continuation value ρV pi+1. The optimal price has a special structure – it equals the monopoly price
plus the future continuation value. This implies that products viewed in earlier stages receive a
higher price markup to induce the consumer to view more products which, in turn, increases the
expected private valuation of the product purchased and with it, the seller’s expected profit.
Another interesting consequence of Corollary 3.2 is that in the exponential case, for any given
ranking, the seller’s expected profit is equal to the expected consumer surplus. This implies that
the ranking that maximizes the seller’s profits also maximizes the consumer surplus:
Corollary 3.3 When  is exponentially distributed, the profit-maximizing pricing solution equates
the seller’s expected profit to the consumer surplus for any given ranking. Thus, the profit-maximizing
ranking also maximizes the consumer surplus.
In the next subsection, we solve the optimal pricing problem for a VA with different objective
functions: (i) a consumer agent that maximizes the expected consumer surplus, and (ii) an altruistic
VA that maximizes the expected total surplus.
3.2 Alternative objective functions
The results of Section 3.1 can be directly generalized to VAs with different objective functions. The
VA may be altruistic, maximizing the total surplus V s = V c + V p, or it may serve as a consumer
agent, maximizing the consumer surplus V c. As we show below, in both cases the seller extracts
no surplus and each product is priced at cost:
Proposition 3.4 (Altruistic/Consumer agent VA: Equilibrium for a given ranking with
 ∼ F (·)): Given σ = (1, 2, · · · , N), the equilibrium (δ,p) satisfy the following recursion:
(a) In stage N ,
The consumer’s threshold is δN = 0.
The equilibrium optimal price is
p∗N = cN
and the equilibrium probability of purchase is
PN = 1− F (cN − vN ).
Under the optimal price, the seller’s expected profit is
V pN = 0,
and the consumer’s expected surplus is
V cN = PNE(N + vN − cN |N + vN − cN ≥ δN ).
(b) In stage i = N − 1, · · · , 1,
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The consumer’s threshold is δi = ρV ci+1.
The equilibrium optimal price is
p∗i = ci
and the equilibrium probability of purchase is
Pi = 1− F (ci − vi + ρV ci+1).
Under the optimal price, the seller’s expected profit is
V pi = 0,
and the consumer’s expected surplus is
V ci = PiE(i + vi − ci|i + vi − ci ≥ δi) + (1− Pi)ρV ci+1.
By Proposition 3.4, both the altruistic VA and the consumer agent follow a very simple pricing
rule, i.e., pi = ci. In addition, for any ranking, the two objective function values (total surplus and
consumer surplus, respectively) are the same. It follows that the optimal rankings under the two
objective functions are also the same.
Corollary 3.5 (Altruistic/Consumer agent VA: Equilibrium and surplus allocation).
In equilibrium, an altruistic VA and a consumer agent share the same optimal ranking and set all
prices pi at cost ci. In expectation, the consumer extracts the entire surplus.
In summary, the percentage of total surplus extracted by the profit-maximizing seller depends on
the distribution of  and is 50% for the exponential distribution (we’ll examine other distributions
in Section 5). Under both altruistic and consumer agent VA, the seller’s expected profit is zero.
In addition, the equilibrium results (ranking, pricing, and consumer thresholds) are the same for a
consumer agent and an altruistic VA, independent of the distribution of . ku
4 Optimal ranking
Using Proposition 3.1, we can solve the optimal ranking problem by complete enumeration, i.e., by
comparing the objective function values across all possible rankings. Finding the optimal ranking is
then the combinatorial problem of searching among all N ! permutations, which becomes intractable
for large N . In this Section, we provide two algorithms for efficiently computing or approximating
the optimal ranking.
4.1 The GPS algorithm
We propose an efficient algorithm which produces the optimal ranking based on checking local pair-
wise optimality. The algorithm, which we call the “Greedy Pairwise Switch” or “GPS” Algorithm,
operates as follows (we describe the algorithm for a profit-maximizing seller; the adjustments for
other objective functions are straightforward). Let σ = (σ1, · · · , σN ) be the current ranking and
R(σ) be the set of all pairwise-switched rankings starting from σ. For example, if N = 3 and
σ = (1, 2, 3), then R(σ) = {(2, 1, 3), (1, 3, 2), (3, 2, 1)}. A pairwise-switched ranking is obtained
by switching two products in the current ranking σ and keeping the ranks of all other products
unchanged. Formally,
R(σ) = {σ′ = (σ1, · · · , σi−1, σj , σi+1, · · · , σj−1, σi, σj+1, · · · , σN ), i < j}.
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Starting with σ, the algorithm checks whether there is a local profit improvement for all σ′ ∈ R(σ).
If there is no local improvement (i.e., V p(σ) ≥ V p(σ′) for all σ′ ∈ R(σ)), the algorithm returns σ
as the optimal ranking. If there is a local improvement, the algorithm updates the current ranking
to the local switch that achieves the largest improvement. The algorithm terminates in finite time
since we have a finite number of possible permutations and it never cycles since each switch provides
a strictly positive improvement.
Figure 1(a) shows that the number of iterations required for the GPS algorithm increases almost
linearly in N and Figure 1(b) shows the average iteration ratio between complete enumeration and
the GPS algorithm. Clearly, GPS is much more efficient than complete enumeration, and in all the
cases we examined in a large number of experiments, it achieved the optimal profit.
(a) Complexity of the GPS algorithm. (b) Complexity ratio for complete enumeration rel-
ative to the GPS algorithm.
Figure 1: Complexity comparison between complete enumeration and the GPS algorithm. Shown is the
average number of iterations as a function of the number of products, N , for each algorithm. The complexity
of the GPS algorithm is linear in N (left figure), a significant improvement over complete enumeration (right
figure) that grows as (N − 1)!.
4.2 Limiting cases and the double-rank approximation
When the survival probability ρ approaches 0 (extremely impatient) or 1 (extremely patient con-
sumer), we obtain the following limits.
Proposition 4.1 (Limiting case analysis)
Assume the private valuations are exponentially distributed. Then, for each of the three objective
functions (profit-maximizing, altruistic or consumer agent VA):
(a) There exists a ρ0 > 0 such that for all ρ ∈ [0, ρ0), the descending ranking in value margins
(vi+E()−ci) is optimal. Further, for a profit-maximizing seller, the optimal prices are given
by the monopoly prices pi = ci + 1α , i = 1, 2, ..., N .
(b) There exists a ρ1 < 1 such that for all ρ ∈ (ρ1, 1], the ascending ranking in value margins
(vi + E()− ci) is optimal.
These limiting results suggest an approximating algorithm which we call the “double-rank approx-
imation.”
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Algorithm. 4.1 (Double-rank approximation). The seller compares the objective function
values for only the descending ranking and the ascending ranking in value margins (vi +E()− ci),
and selected the one that achieves the higher value.
The double-rank approximation is obviously computationally efficient since it only requires 2N
iterations. But how close are its results to the optimal results? We evaluate the efficiency of the
algorithm through the ratio of expected profits under the double-rank algorithm to the optimal
objective function value. Multiple numerical experiments show that in spite of the simplicity of the
double-rank approximation, it is surprisingly efficient.
Our numerical experiments use the Gamma distribution, which is widely used in applications
(Appendix B summarizes key features of the Gamma distribution and lists the parameters of
our numerical experiments). We present here the results for three private valuation distributions:
exponential with unit mean (Figure 2(a)), Gamma (2, 0.5) (Figure 2(b)), and Gamma (5, 10) (Figure
2(c)). As seen in the figures, the descending order remains optimal even for moderate values of ρ
and the ascending order kicks in only at ρ = 0.99 for the Gamma (5, 0.1) and Exp(1) cases, and
at ρ = 0.9 when the distribution is Gamma (5, 10) (where the private valuations have a higher
variance ab2). The results indicate that with lower information asymmetry, the descending order
in value margins is more likely to be optimal. Throughout, the double-rank algorithm achieves at
least 95% of the optimal profit. Similar results are obtained for the other objective functions.
(a) Gamma(1, 1) = Exp(1) (b) Gamma(2, 0.5) (c) Gamma(5, 10)
Figure 2: Efficiency of the double-rank approximation for Gamma-distributed private valuations. The
figure shows the ratio of the expected profit achieved by the double-rank approximation to the optimal
expected profit, and how it depends on the consumer patience level ρ. Shown are results for (i) Exp(1), (ii)
Gamma (2,0.5), and (iii) Gamma (5,10).
5 Implications
In this Section, we discuss some of the implications of the foregoing results. We have considered
three different objective functions for the VA: a consumer agent, an altruistic VA and a (seller)
profit-maximizing VA. By proposition 3.4, under the first two objective functions (consumer agent
or altruistic VA), pi = ci for all i and the consumer extracts the entire surplus. When the VA
maximizes the seller’s profit, the optimal prices and surplus allocation depend on the consumer pa-
tience parameter and on the distribution of private information. When the private information is
exponentially distributed, the surplus is equally split between the consumer and the seller, indepen-
dent of the other problem parameters. The results are more complex when the private information
follows a general distribution and we illustrate them using numerical examples.
16
We consider N = 6 products with expected valuations (0, 1/6, 1/3, 1/2, 2/3, 5/6) and zero costs
(ci = 0) (see Appendix B for a full listing of the parameters). Fixing these parameters, we first
examine the structure of the optimal solution (pricing and ranking) when the private valuations
are exponentially distributed (Subsection 5.1). We then consider the structure of the solution when
the private valuations follow the more general gamma distribution (Subsection 5.2) and we finally
consider how information asymmetry affects the pricing, ranking and surplus allocation (Subsection
5.3).
5.1 Ranking and pricing: exponential case
We first consider the problem with  ∼ exp(1) for different levels of the consumer patience parameter
ρ (Figure 3).
Figure 3: Comparison of virtual assistant prices when  is exponentially distributed,  ∼ exp(1), for
ρ = 0.1, 0.5, 0.9 (brown lines) and ρ = 1 (blue line). The horizontal axis shows the six product valuations.
The vertical axis shows the corresponding prices. The presentation rank is either descending (brown lines)
or ascending (blue line) in the expected valuations.
When ρ is 0.9 or less (brown lines), the optimal ranking is descending in the expected valuations,
and the seller ranks the most valuable product (with expected valuation 5/6) first, similar to the
limiting results in Proposition 4.1(a). When ρ = 1 (blue line), the optimal ranking is ascending in
the expected valuations, and the seller ranks the most valuable product last, as shown in Proposition
4.1 (b).
One might expect higher-valued products to command higher prices. In this case, however,
Corollary 3.2 shows that for a given ranking, the optimal price of each product i is independent of
its own expected valuation, and it depends primarily on its rank which determines ρV pi+1 through the
expected valuations of products i+1, i+2, . . . N . The pricing decision balances two considerations:
on the one hand, an impatient consumer is unlikely to buy the products presented late, suggesting
a higher margin for products presented earlier, which are more likely to be bought by the consumer.
On the other hand, the different products effectively compete with one another, with less candidates
remaining to be viewed, the seller has greater market power so it can extract higher margins
(at the extreme, when only one product is left, Corollary 3.2 shows that the seller charges the
monopoly price). The optimal balance depends on the consumer’s impatience parameter ρ: When
the consumer is relatively impatient, the seller prefers to charge higher margins on the products
presented earlier since there is only a small probability that she will buy products presented later.
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When the consumer is patient, there is a high probability that the consumer will wait and the seller
charges higher margins on the products presented later. Accordingly, Figure 3 shows that when ρ
is 0.9 or less (brown lines), the margins decrease as the product rank increases, whereas for ρ = 1
(blue line), the margins increase along with the product rank.
Figure 3 also shows that for any given ranking σ, each product’s optimal price increases in the
consumer patience parameter ρ. The Proposition below generalizes this finding.
Proposition 5.1 (Monotonicity in Optimal Prices)
When the private valuations  are exponentially distributed, under any given ranking, the optimal
prices increase in the consumer patience parameter ρ.
Proposition 5.1 follows from the fact that under any given ranking, product i’s optimal price is
the sum of the monopoly price 1α + ci and the markup ρV σi+1, which in turn is increasing in ρ.
Intuitively, a more patient consumer receives a higher surplus, which allows the seller to extract
more of that surplus through higher prices.
5.2 Ranking and pricing: Gamma private valuations
When the private valuations are not exponentially distributed, the optimal solution becomes more
complex. By Proposition 4.1, at the limits as ρ goes to zero or 1, the optimal rankings are monotone
in the products’ value margins. In the example below, we show that, for the Gamma distribution,
(i) monotone rankings remain optimal for a wide range of (although not all) ρ values; and (ii) in
the narrow range where the optimal ranking is not monotone, it changes quickly from descending
to ascending through multiple switches.
We consider  ∼ Gamma(2, 0.5) and vary ρ from zero to 1 (Table 1 and Figure 4). As shown
in the Table, the descending ranking is optimal for all ρ ∈ [0, 0.94718), and the ascending ranking
is optimal when ρ ∈ (0.99988, 1]). In-between (ρ ∈ (0.94719, 0.99988)), the solution (ranking and
product prices) changes ten times.
i 1 2 3 4 5 6
Expected Valuation 0 16
1
3
1
2
2
3
5
6
(0.00000, 0.94718] 6 5 4 3 2 1
(0.94719, 0.95305] 6 5 4 3 1 2
(0.95306, 0.95687] 6 5 4 2 1 3
(0.95688, 0.95984] 6 5 3 2 1 4
(0.95985, 0.96250] 6 4 3 2 1 5
(0.96251, 0.99552] 5 4 3 2 1 6
(0.99553, 0.99859] 4 3 2 1 5 6
(0.99860, 0.99865] 3 2 4 1 5 6
(0.99866, 0.99950] 3 2 1 4 5 6
(0.99951, 0.99956] 2 3 1 4 5 6
(0.99957, 0.99987] 2 1 3 4 5 6
(0.99988, 1.00000] 1 2 3 4 5 6
Table 1: Optimal rankings for different consumer patience levels ρ when  ∼ Gamma(2, 0.5). Shown are
the optimal rankings for each range of ρ values in (0,1]. For example, the optimal ranking permutation is
(6, 5, 4, 3, 1, 2) when ρ ∈ (0.94719, 0.95305].
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Figure 4: Optimal prices for different values of consumer patience parameter ρ when  ∼ Gamma(2, 0.5).
Shown are the optimal prices for the six products in each range of ρ values in [0.9, 1] (the behavior in (0, 0.9)
is similar to the behavior in (0.9, 0.9478)). The red stars identify changes in the optimal ranking.
Similar to the exponential case, the consumer patience parameter ρ influences the optimal prices
through the markup and the optimal ranking. As we observe in Figure 4, in each interval where
the optimal ranking remains constant, the optimal price is increasing in ρ for each product.
5.3 Effects of information asymmetry
In this Subsection, we study the effects of information asymmetry on the allocation of surplus.
Whereas the seller knows only the vis, the consumer can also learn the realization of the is. This
gives the consumer an informational advantage that, intuitively, should increase with the variance
of . To study how this information asymmetry affects our results, we consider Gamma-distributed
private valuations with shape parameter a and scale parameter b, fixing the mean at E() = ab = 1
and changing the shape parameter a. With a constant mean, increasing the shape parameter a is
equivalent to reducing the variance (Var() = ab2 = 1a) of the consumer’s private information.
Figure 5 shows that as the shape parameter a increases, the seller’s surplus share increases
as expected. When a = 1, the distribution of  is exponential and the seller extracts 50% of the
surplus. The limit as a → ∞ (not shown) is deterministic with no private information. In this
case, the seller extracts all the surplus and consumer gets 0.
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‘
Figure 5: Seller’s surplus share for a profit-maximizing VA. The private information  ∼ Gamma(a, b), ab =
1. As a increases, the variance 1a decreases.
6 Web interface vs. virtual assistant
Traditional web-based sellers such as Amazon, eBay and Taobao dominate today’s electronic com-
merce market. What would be the effect of the predicted shift to sales through virtual assistants
on pricing, seller profits and consumer surplus? To answer this question, we model sales through a
web interface and compare the results to those we obtained for a virtual assistant. We focus on a
(seller) profit-maximizing VA.
6.1 Web Interface: Model
Consider a web interface that enables the presentation of k products per page. In our model, the
consumer specifies what she is looking for and the seller presents the available products a page (k
products) at a time. The consumer then examines the entire page and decides whether to choose a
product within that page, or to proceed to the next page. The process continues until the consumer
exits.
As in our virtual assistant model, the consumer is impatient and stays on for an exponential
amount of time with mean 1τc . We assume that with the web interface, the time to evaluate a page
is exponentially distributed with rate κτp/k, where κ is an acceleration factor specifying how fast
the consumer views one page (1 ≤ κ ≤ k). When κ = k, the expected time to view an entire page
is the same as that for evaluating one product with the virtual assistant, whereas when κ = 1,
viewing a page takes k times as long as evaluating a single product with the virtual assistant. We
denote by ul,i = vl,i + l,i− pl,i the realized utility when the consumer buys the ith product on page
l, and by vl,i the valuation of the ith product on page l.
With this specification, the virtual assistant corresponds to the special case of a web interface
with k = κ = 1. We compare the behavior of prices and the allocation of surplus between the web
interface and the virtual assistant.
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6.2 Profit-maximization
6.2.1 Optimal pricing
For a given ranking, the equilibrium prices and the consumer’s optimal thresholds under the web
interface are given by Proposition 6.1, whose straightforward proof is omitted.
Proposition 6.1 (Web-interface equilibrium for a given ranking with  ∼ F (·))
Given σ = (1, 2, · · · , N), an equilibrium (δ,p) must satisfy the following recursion:
(a) In stage n := dNk e,
The consumer’s threshold is δn = 0.
For any price vector p, the probability of purchasing product i in stage n is given by
Pn,i = P(un,i ≥ δn, un,i ≥ un,j for all j 6= i, j is on page n),
where un,i = vn,i + n,i − pi.
The seller’s expected profit in stage n is given by
V pn = max
p∈Rk
∑
i
Pn,i(pn,i − cn,i).
Let pn be the maximizer of the above equation, then the consumer’s expected surplus in
stage n is given by
V cn =
∑
i
Pn,iE(n,i + vn,i − pn,i|un,i ≥ δn, un,i ≥ un,j , for all j 6= i, j is on page n).
(b) In stage l = n− 1, · · · , 1,
The consumer’s threshold is δl = ρV cl+1.
For any price vector p, the probability of purchasing product i in stage n is given by
Pl,i = P(ul,i ≥ δl, ul,i ≥ ul,j , for all j 6= i, j is on page l),
where ul,i = vl,i + l,i − pi.
The seller’s expected profit in stage l is given by
V pl = max
p∈Rk
∑
i
Pl,i(pl,i − cl,i) + ρ(1−
∑
i
Pl,i)V pl+1.
Let pl be the maximizer of the above equation, then the consumer’s expected surplus in
stage l is given by
V cl =
∑
i
Pl,iE(l,i+vl,i−cl,i|ul,i ≥ δl, ul,i ≥ ul,j , for all j 6= i, j is on pagel)+(1−
∑
i
Pl,i)ρV cl+1.
Proposition 6.1 holds regardless of whether N is divisible by k. It enables us to compute the optimal
ranking following the methodology of Section 5.
We next illustrate the effects of the user interface on price behavior using numerical examples.
As before, we first consider a seller selling 6 products with expected valuations 0, 1/6, 1/3, 1/2, 2/3
and 5/6, where the private valuations are exponentially distributed with unit mean,  ∼ exp(1).
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We compare the virtual assistant and the web interface with k = 2, 3 or 6 products per page in
Figure 6.
(a) ρ = 0.1 (b) ρ = 0.9
(c) ρ = 1
Figure 6: Price comparison between virtual assistant and web interface with k = 2, 3 or 6 products per
page, with κ = 1. We present the optimal prices under the optimal ranking for ρ = τpτc+τp = 0.1 (a) , 0.9 (b),
and 1 (c). In the figure, the label P.i means that the product is presented on page i. Some page labels are
not shown for nearly-overlapping data points.
Across pages, the price pattern we observe is similar to the one we obtained for the virtual
assistant. For low and moderate values of ρ, the virtual assistant ranked products in descending
order of product valuations and the prices were increasing in product valuations. Similarly, the web-
interface places the products with higher valuations on earlier pages (Figure 6(a),(b)), and these
products are priced higher. Although under the web-interface, the there is no elegant decomposition
of price into a monopoly price and a continuation markup, the intuition carries over: when the
consumer is willing to accept a product presented early, the seller infers that she has a favorable
private valuation, which the seller exploits to extract a higher profit. For large ρ, the optimal
ranking and pricing rules for the virtual assistant were reversed: the optimal order was ascending,
and prices were descending, in product valuations. We observe a similar pattern under the web-
interface: the order is descending in the product valuations and the optimal prices are higher for
the earlier pages (Figure 6(c)).
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However, the prices within a page are monotone decreasing in the product valuations in all three
figures. We explain in detail why this happens in Appendix D for the case of two products on a
single page. In the Appendix, we prove that for a web interface with two products on the same page,
the optimal prices reverse the order of product valuations. This happens because the equilibrium
price of p1 is not a function of v1, but is an increasing function of the other product’s price margin
v2−p2. Similarly, the equilibrium price of p2 is not a function of v2, but is an increasing function of
the other product’s price margin v1−p1. An increase in v1 does not have a direct effect on product
1’s equilibrium price, but it increases p2 through the increase in the price margin of product 1
(equation (6) in Appendix D). However, increasing on p2 further decreases the value-price margin
of product 2, hence it further decreases the equilibrium price of product 1. And we have the prices
are in reverse order of valuations.
6.2.2 Surplus allocation
To compare the surplus allocation under the two regimes, we consider again the Gamma-distributed
private valuations studied in Section 5 with shape parameter a, scale parameter b, and constant
mean ab = 1. We increase the shape parameter a from 0.5 to 3, decreasing the variance 1a and
thereby the amount of private information. Figure 7 shows the seller’s surplus share (the ratio
Vp
Vp+Vc of seller profit to total surplus) for N = 6 products for different values of the impatience
parameter ρ, number of products on a page k and acceleration factor κ.
(a) ρ = 0.1, k = 2. (b) ρ = 0.1, k = 3. (c) ρ = 0.1, k = 6.
(d) ρ = 1, k = 2. (e) ρ = 1, k = 3. (f) ρ = 1, k = 6.
Figure 7: seller surplus share as a function of the Gamma shape parameter a for fixed mean ab = 1 and
N = 6 products for different values of ρ and k and for κ = 1 or k. As a increases, the variance of the private
valuations decreases.
We first consider how the problem parameters (the Gamma shape parameter a, which deter-
mines the amount of private information; the acceleration factor κ, which affects the consumer’s
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speed of evaluation; and the number of products presented per page k) affect the surplus allocation
under the web-interface.
Figures 7 show that the seller surplus share is decreasing in the shape parameter a. This is
consistent with our prior intuition and results for the virtual assistant case (Figure 5 in Section 5):
as a increases, the amount of private information decreases, which allows the seller to extract more
of the total surplus.
Second, as the acceleration factor κ increases, the consumer can explore more products, which
benefits both the consumer and the seller. As a result, the levels of both the consumer surplus
and the seller profit increase. Figures 7 show that this acceleration has only a small effect on the
surplus ratio.
Finally, looking across Figures 7 (with the same a), we observe that the seller’s surplus share
increases with k. This effect is best interpreted in conjunction with a comparison of the web-
interface and the virtual assistant. A key driver of this comparison is the seller’s power of price
commitment under the web-interface. A well-known fundamental result in game theory is that
being able to commit to a strategy before other players move is generally beneficial (cf. Courty
and Hao (2000)).
When comparing the web-interface to the virtual assistant, the former enables the seller to
commit to a full page of prices while the virtual assistant dynamically prices a product at a time.
Thus, the web interface has higher commitment power, which is an increasing function of the
number of products per page k. Thus, we expect (i) the web-interface to result in a higher surplus
share for the seller, and (ii) the surplus share to increase with k, which is what we observe in Figure
7. As for (ii), an increase in k also allows the consumer to view more products, but as we have
seen earlier, the effect of this factor on the surplus share is small.
However, the viewing rate is always higher in a web interface (web interface: τpκ, virtual
assistant τp), which enables the consumer to view more products in a web interface. As we discussed
before, it favors both consumer and the seller, thus has little influence on the surplus allocation.
Overall, the effect of commitment power dominates the effect of viewing rate and as we observe
from figure 7, the surplus allocation is always higher in a web-interface.
7 Concluding remarks
With an increasing number of consumers choosing to purchase products through virtual assistants,
this emerging channel is expected to become an important gateway to commerce. It is important
to understand how the special features of virtual assistants (in particular, the sequential nature of
product presentation) affect the market outcomes.
In this paper, we developed a model of a forward-looking consumer who strategically makes
sequential purchase decisions after submitting a request to a virtual assistant which makes ranking
and pricing decisions. The virtual assistant may operate on behalf of a profit-maximizing seller, it
may be altruistic, or it may act as a consumer agent. We find the optimal prices under a general
private valuation distribution and derive them in closed-form when the distribution is exponential.
We find that in the exponential case, a profit-maximizing seller extracts the same surplus as the
consumer. As a result, the profit-maximizing ranking also maximizes the consumer surplus. For
an altruistic seller or a consumer agent, we find that pricing at cost is optimal and the consumer
extracts the entire surplus. We develop algorithms for optimally ranking products and find that
the simple descending or ascending rankings are optimal when consumers are highly patient or
impatient. We propose the double-rank approximation algorithm which is shown to capture at
least 95% of the surplus in numerical experiments.
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In July 2020, the European Commission launched an inquiry into the market for consumer
products and services linked to the Internet of Things with a focus on voice assistants. Citing the
“incredible potential” of these devices, Commission Executive Vice-President Margrethe Vestager
focused on the “risk that some of these players could become gatekeepers of the Internet of Things,
with the power to make or break other companies. And these gatekeepers might use that power to
harm competition, to the detriment of consumers... whether that’s for a new set of batteries for
your remote control or for your evening takeaway. In either case, the result can be less choice for
users, less opportunity for others to compete, and less innovation” (Vestager (2020)).
Analyzing the effects of selling through a VA compared to selling through a traditional web
interface calls for an explicit analysis of the two equilibria. We perform such an analysis where the
seller may sell through a VA or through a web interface, where products are presented on multiple
web pages with each page showing multiple products simultaneously. One might expect that when
the VA maximizes the seller’s profits, it will exploit its gatekeeper control over product presentation
to extract a larger share of the surplus. We find that the opposite is true: the seller’s equilibrium
surplus share is in fact larger with a web interface, where it can credibly commit to fixed prices on
each page. We also find that when the consumer’s private valuations are exponentially distributed,
the optimal prices within a page are decreasing in product valuations.
There are several interesting extensions to this work. First, it will be useful to extend our
analysis to the case where the consumer has imperfect recall. Second, it is interesting to study a
three-sided platform model where strategic suppliers and consumers are mediated through a VA.
The VA might first decide on the price of each position. Observing these prices, suppliers might
then decide which positions to acquire and bring in their products with associated prices. Finally,
consumers might use the platform to make buying decisions.
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Appendices
A Notation
• i : Product index; i = 1, 2, . . . , N , where N is the number of products.
• τc : a consumer request is live for an exponential duration with rate τc.
• τp : the presentation and evaluation time of each offer is exponentially distributed with rate
τp.
• vi + i : valuation of product i, where
• vi : observable part of the valuation of product i;
• i : unobservable (random) part of the valuation of product i, i ∼ F .
• α : when i are exponentially distributed, E(i) = 1/α.
• σ : product ranking permutation, σ = (σ1, . . . , σn).
• ρ : probability that the consumer completes a product evaluation.
• pi : consumer price of product i.
• ci : platform cost to acquire and ship product i when it’s sold to the consumer.
• δi : consumer threshold valuation. The consumer buys product i when ui = vi − pi + i ≥ δi.
• Pi = P(σi ≥ pσi + δσi − vσi) : probability that the consumer buys the ith product offered.
B Parameters in Numerical Examples
The numerical examples in sections 4–6 consider the following default setting:
• N = 6 products with valuation vector v = (0, 16 ,
1
3 .
1
2 ,
2
3 ,
5
6) and costs ci = 0(i = 1, 2, . . . , 6);
and
•  ∼ Gamma (a, b).
Gamma (a, b) is the Gamma distribution with shape parameter a and scale parameter b. This
distribution is widely used in applications; we summarize here some of its salient properties:
• Mean E() = ab;
• Variance V ar() = ab2;
• For a fixed mean, increasing the shape parameter a reduces the variance ab2 = E()/a.
•  is exponential when a = 1 and has the uniform distribution as its limit as a→∞.
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C Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3.1
The proof is by backward induction.
(a) Stage N : In stage N , the consumer will purchase if and only if
N + vN − pN ≥ δN = 0,
and the probability of purchase at any price p is 1− F (p− vN ). The seller’s expected profit
is then given by (1− F (p− vN )) · (p− cN ); denote the maximizer by p∗N .
The maximizer exists because both at pN = cN and as pN →∞, the expected profit goes to
zero. The optimal expected profit is positive since pN = cN results in zero profit, and the
derivative at cN (given by (1 − F (cN − vN )) is positive (since (vi − ci) are non-positive and
F (·) is positively supported).
The equilibrium probability of purchase in stage N is clearly
PN = 1− F (p∗N − vN ),
and the seller’s expected profit is thus
V pN = PN (p
∗
N − cN ).
The consumer’s expected surplus under the optimal price is equal to the consumer’s expected
valuation times the purchase probability conditional on the valuation exceeding the stage-N
threshold, hence
V cN = PNE(N + vN − p∗N |N + vN − p∗N ≥ δN ).
(b) We next use backward induction. In stage i = N−1, . . . , 1, the consumer will purchase if and
only if her current-stage realized valuation is greater than her expected future return, i.e., if
i + vi − pi ≥ ρV ci+1, which gives us a threshold-policy structure with δi = ρV ci+1.
It follows that the probability of purchase given any price p is 1 − F (p − vi + ρV ci+1). The
seller’s expected profit is the sum of its expected gain when the consumer accepts the current
offer and its expected gain when the consumer continues to the next stage, given by:
(1− F (p− vi + ρV ci+1))(p− ci) + F (p− vi + ρV ci+1)ρV pi+1.
A similar argument to the one for i = N shows that a finite maximizer always exists, the
equilibrium probability of purchase in stage i is Pi = 1 − F (p∗i − vi + ρV ci+1), the seller’s
expected profit in stage i is
V pi = Pi(p∗i − ci) + (1− Pi)ρV pi ,
and the expected consumer surplus is
V ci = PiE(i + vi − p∗i |i + vi − p∗i ≥ δi)) + (1− Pi)ρV ci+1.
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Proof of Corollary 3.2
The results follow from Proposition 3.1 with  ∼ exp(α).
(a) In stage N , δN = 0 and since  ∼ exp(α), the seller’s expected profit is given by (1− F (p−
vN ))(p− cN ) with optimal price
p∗N = cN +
1− F (pN − vN )
f(pN − vN ) = cN +
1
α
.
Plugging p∗N into the expression for PN , we have
PN = exp(−α(cN + 1
α
− vN )) = exp(α(vN − cN )− 1)
and
V pN = PN (p
∗
N − cN ) =
1
α
exp(α(vN − cN )− 1) = 1
α
PN .
Now, plugging p∗N and δN into the expression for V cN and using the memeoryless property of
the exponential distribution, we get
V cN = PNE(N + vN − p∗N |N + vN − p∗N ≥ δN )
= 1
α
exp(α(vN − cN )− 1) = 1
α
PN .
(b) For stages i = N − 1, . . . , 1, Proposition 3.1 implies δi = ρV ci+1 with optimal price
p∗i = arg maxp (1− F (p− vi + ρV
c
i+1))(p− ci) + F (p− vi + ρV ci+1)ρV pi+1
= ci +
1− F (δi)
f(δi)
+ ρV pi+1 = ci +
1
α
+ ρV pi+1.
The equilibrium probability of purchase in stage i is given by
Pi = 1− F (p∗i − vi + ρV ci+ 1) = exp(α(vi − ci)− 1) exp(−αρ(V ci+1 + V pi+1)),
the expected seller profit is
V pi = Pi(p∗i − ci) + (1− Pi)ρV pi+1
= 1
α
Pi + ρV pi+1 =
1
α
N∑
k=i
ρk−iPk,
and the expected consumer surplus is
V ci = PiE(i + vi − p∗i |i + vi − p∗i ≥ δi)) + (1− Pi)ρV ci+1
= 1
α
Pi + ρV ci+1 =
1
α
N∑
k=i
ρk−iPk.
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Proof of Proposition 3.4
We prove proposition 3.4 by backward induction.
(a) In stage N , the optimal threshold is δN = 0 and the total surplus is
V sN = E(N + vN − cN |N + vN − pN )P(N + vN − pN ≥ δN )
=
∫ ∞
δN+pN−vN
(x+ vN − cN )f(x)dx.
Now,
∂V sN
∂pN
= −(δN + pN − cN )f(δN + pN − vN ) = −(pN − cN )f(pN − vN ).
Since F (·) has positive support and vN ≤ cN , V sN is constant in (−∞, vN ), strictly increasing
in (vN , cN ], and strictly decreasing in (cN ,∞). Thus, the optimal price is pN = cN , V sN = V cN
and V pN = 0.
(b) In stage i = N − 1, . . . , 1, δi = ρV ci+1 = ρV si+1, the expected total surplus is
V si = E(i + vi − ci|i + vi − pi ≥ δi)P(i + vi − pi ≥ δi) + (1− P(i + vi − pi ≥ δi))ρV si+1
=
∫ ∞
δi+pi−vi
(x+ vi − ci)f(x)dx+ (1−
∫ ∞
δi+pi−vi
f(x))ρV si+1
=
∫ ∞
δi+pi−vi
(x+ vi − ci − ρV si+1)f(x)dx+ ρV si+1,
and
∂V si
∂pi
= −(δi − ρV si+1pi − ci)f(δi + pi − vi) = −(pi − ci)f(δi + pi − vi).
Again, V si is constant in (−∞, vi−δi), strictly increasing in (vi−δi, ci], and strictly decreasing
in (ci,∞). Thus, the optimal price is pi = ci and the inductive hypothesis holds.
Finally, since V ip = 0 for all i, pi = ci maximizes both the expected consumer surplus and the
total surplus.
Proof of Proposition 4.1
(a) We show that there exists a ρ0 > 0 such that for all ρ ∈ [0, ρ0), the descending ranking (in
value margins) is optimal. We first prove the result for a profit-maximizing seller and then for an
altruistic seller or a consumer agent.
Let the ranking permutation be σ. For a profit-maximizing VA, following Corollary 3.2, the
seller’s expected profit in the first stage is given by
V p1 =
1
α
N∑
k=1
ρk−1Pk.
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Taking ρ→ 0, as Pk are bounded for all k, the the expected first-stage profit is given by
V p1 =
1
α
P1 + o(ρ)
by Corollary 3.2. Let Mσ(i) = exp(α(vσ(i) − cσ(i)). Then,
P1(ρ) = exp(α(vσ(1) − cσ(1))− 1) exp(−αρ(2V p2 )) = Mσ(i) exp(−1) exp(−αρ(2V p2 )).
Taking ρ→ 0 and using the Taylor’s series expansion for exp(−αρ(2V p2 )), we have
P1(ρ) = Mσ(i) exp(−1)− 2αV p2 ρ+ o(ρ2).
Since V p2 is bounded,
V p1 = Mσ(i) exp(−1) + o(ρ).
Since Mσ(i) is increasing in vσ(i) − cσ(i), the VA maximizes V p1 by placing the product with the
highest value-margin first.
It is of course possible that the consumer will progress to the second stage (due to a small enough
realization of 1). By Corollary 3.2, the corresponding expected profit is
V p2 =
1
α
N∑
k=2
ρk−2Pk.
Similar to our analysis of stage 1,
V p2 = Mσ(2) exp(−1) + o(ρ),
and the optimal σ(2) is given by the remaining product with the highest value-margin, namely the
one with the second-highest value margin. By induction, the optimal ranking as ρ → 0 is thus
descending in products’ value margins. By Corollary 3.2, the optimal prices are given by
p∗i = ci +
1
α
+ ρV pi+1 = ci +
1
α
+ o(ρ),
since V pi+1 are bounded.
We next consider the case of a consumer agent VA. Let the ranking permutation be σ. By
Corollary 3.5, the expected first-stage surplus is given by
V c1 = P1E(+ vσ(1) − cσ(1)|+ vσ(1) − cσ(1) ≥ ρV c2 ) + (1− P1)ρV c2 .
As (1− P1)V c2 is bounded from above, taking ρ→ 0,
V c1 = P1E(+ vσ(1) − cσ(1)|+ vσ(1) − cσ(1) ≥ ρV c2 ) + o(ρ)
= (1− F (−(vσ(1) − cσ(1))))E(+ vσ(1) − cσ(1)|+ vσ(1) − cσ(1) ≥ 0) + o(ρ).
For t = vi − ci,
∂
∂t
(1− F (−t))
∫ ∞
−t
(+ t)f()d
= (1− F (−t))
∫ ∞
−t
f()d+ f(−t)
∫ ∞
−t
(+ t)f()d ≥ 0,
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so V c1 is increasing in the value margin of the first product presented. To maximize V c1 , the VA
should thus place the item with the highest value-margin first.
Proceeding to stage 2, from Corollary 3.5 the expected consumer surplus is given by
V c2 = P2E(+ vσ(2) − cσ(2)|+ vσ(2) − cσ(2) ≥ ρV c3 ) + (1− P2)ρV c3 .
As before, as ρ→ 0 V c2 is dominated by the expected consumer surplus at stage 2:
V c2 = (1− F (−(vσ(2) − cσ(2))))E(+ vσ(2) − cσ(2)|+ vσ(2) − cσ(2) ≥ 0) + o(ρ).
Following the foregoing analysis, since V c2 is increasing in the value-margin of the second product,
the σ(2) that maximizes V c2 is given by the product with second-highest value margin. By induc-
tion, the optimal ranking as ρ→ 0 is given by descending order of the value-margins.
By Corollary 3.5, the same results hold for an altruistic VA.
(b) We prove first the case of profit-maximization, using the following claim.
Claim: If σ = (σ(1), · · · , σ(N)) is the optimal ranking, the sub-permutation σ¯i := (σ(i), σ(i +
1), · · · , σ(N)) is the optimal ranking for the subproblem from stage i through N , i.e., V pi (σ¯i) =
maxσ′ V pi (σ′).
Proof: Let Mi = exp(α(vi − ci)) and rewrite V pi as a function of Mσ(i) and V pi+1 : V pi =
f(Mσ(i), V pi+1). Now,
V pi = f(Mσ(i), V
p
i+1) = Pi(pσ(i) − cσ(i)) + (1− Pi)ρV pi+1 (3)
= Pi(
1
α
+ ρV pi+1) + (1− Pi)ρV pi+1
= 1
α
exp(α(vσ(i) − cσ(i))− 1) exp(−2αρV pi+1) + ρV pi+1
= 1
αe
exp(−2αρV pi+1)Mσ(i) + ρV pi+1.
We have that ∂f∂V = ρ(1− 2ee−2αVM) > 0, which implies that V pi is increasing in V pi+1.
Now, when we fix the order of the first i− 1 products, ∂V p
∂V pi
= ∂V p
∂V p2
∂V p2
∂V p3
· · · ∂V
p
i−1
∂V pi
> 0. Therefore,
if σ¯i does not maximize V pi , there exists another σ¯′
i such that V pi (σ¯′
i) > V pi (σ¯i). But then
V p((σ(1), · · · , σ(i− 1), σ¯′i)) > V p((σ(1), · · · , σ(i− 1), σ¯i)) = V p(σ),
thereby contradicting the optimality of σ.
We next show by backward induction that for ρ = 1 and an optimal ranking σ, each sub-permutation
σ¯i satisfies the monotonicity condition vσ(i) − cσ(i) ≤ vσ(i+1) − cσ(i+1) ≤ · · · ≤ vσ(N) − cσ(N), or
equivalently Mσ(i) ≤Mσ(i+1) ≤ · · · ≤Mσ(N) for all i.
• Baseline case: The statement is trivially true for the baseline case when i = N .
• Induction: Assume the statement holds for for k = i+ 1, · · · , N . We prove it also holds for
k = i, namely Mσ(i) ≤Mσ(i+1).
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Assume by contradiction that Mσ(i) > Mσ(i+1). Then, we switch products σ(i) and σ(i+ 1)
to obtain the permutation σ′ :
σ′ = (σ(1), σ(2), · · · , σ(i+ 1), σ(i), σ(i+ 2), · · · , σ(N)).
We will show that the sub-permutation σ¯i := {σ(i), σ(i + 1), · · · , σ(N)} doesn’t maximize
V pi , contradicting the inductive hypothesis.
Since σ and σ′ only differ in the i−th and (i + 1)-th positions, σ¯i+2 = σ¯′i+2 and we de-
note V pi+2(σ¯i+2) = V
p
i+2(σ¯′
i+2) by V¯ . The expected profits under the two rankings are as
follows:
V pi+1(σ¯i+1) = V¯ +
Mσ(i+1)
αe
e−2αV¯ ,
V pi (σ¯i) = V¯ +
Mσ(i+1)
αe
e−2αV¯ +
Mσ(i)
αe
e−2αρV¯−
2
e
e−2αV¯Mσ(i+1) ,
V pi+1(σ¯′
i+1) = V¯ +
Mσ(i)
αe
e−2αV¯ , and
V pi (σ¯′
i) = V¯ +
Mσ(i)
αe
e−2αV¯ +
Mσ(i+1)
αe
e−2αV¯−
2
e
e−2αV¯Mσ(i) .
Showing that V pi (σ¯i) < V
p
i (σ¯′
i) is equivalent to showing that the function
g(x) := 1
x
− exp(−
2
e exp(−2αV¯ )x)
x
is increasing in x. Let 2e exp(−2αV¯ ) =: k < 1, then
g(x) = −1
x
+ exp(−kx)
x
.
The first derivative of g(x) is
g′(x) = 1− exp(−kx)(kx+ 1)
x2
.
Since exp(−kx)(kx + 1) < 1 for 0 < kx < 1, it follows that g′(x) > 0 and V pi (σ¯i) < V pi (σ¯′
i).
This contradicts the claim that σ¯i maximizes V pi .
From equation (3) we know that V pi (σ)andV
p
i (σ′) are continuous in ρ. By continuity, there
exists a ρ1 such that the monotonicity would hold for all ρ ∈ (ρ1, 1]. We have thus proved
that there exists a ρ1 such that for all ρ ∈ (ρ1, 1], Mσ(i) < Mσ(i+1) < · · · < Mσ(N).
We next prove the result for an altruistic VA and a consumer agent. Notice that in the proof
of the profit-maximizing case, the key was to show that (i) V pi is monotone in V
p
i+1, and (ii)
V pi (σ¯i) < V
p
i (σ¯′
i) when ρ = 1. To prove (i), we have for a consumer agent (and an altruistic
platform) with ρ = 1:
V pi = f(Mσ(i), Vi+1) =
Mσ(i)
α
exp(−αρV pi+1) + ρV pi+1, and
∂f
∂V pi+1
= ρ− ρMσ(i) exp(−αρV pi+1) > 0
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which proves (i). Similarly,
V pi (σ¯i) = V¯ +
Mσ(i)
α
exp(−αV¯ ) + Mσ(i)
α
exp(−αV¯ −Mσ(i+1) exp(−αV¯ )),
V pi (σ¯′
i) = V¯ +
Mσ(i)
α
exp(−αV¯ ) + Mσ(i+1)
α
exp(−αV¯ −Mσ(i) exp(−αV¯ )), and
α
Mσ(i)Mσ(i+1)
(Vi(σ¯′
i)− Vi(σ¯i)) = 1
Mσ(i)
exp(−αV¯ −Mσ(i) exp(−αV¯ ))−
1
Mσ(i)
exp(−αV¯ )
− 1
Mσ(i+1)
exp(−αV¯ −Mσ(i+1) exp(−αV¯ ))−
1
Mσ(i+1)
exp(−αV¯ .)′
Now, letting k = exp(−αV¯ ) < 1 and following the analogous steps from the profit-maximizing
case, g(x) = − 1x + exp(− exp(−αV¯ )x)x is increasing in x. Thus, the monotonicity holds for ρ = 1 as in
the profit-maximizing case and continuity implies that there exist a ρ1 such that for all ρ ∈ (ρ1, 1],
the ascending ranking in (vi − ci) is optimal.
Proof of Proposition 5.1
We prove Proposition 5.1 by backward-induction. We’ll be using Corollary 3.2 that V pi = V ci in
the calculation below.
We first prove the monotonicity of the continuation valuations in the customer patience parame-
ter ρ. Specifically, we show that under any given ranking σ and in any given stage i ∈ {1, . . . , N−1},
the continuation value V pi+1 is monotone increasing in ρ.
• Inductive hypothesis: V ci (V
p
i ) is (weakly) monotone increasing in ρ, i.e.,
∂V ci
∂ρ (
∂V pi
∂ρ ) ≥ 0 for
all i ∈ {N,N − 1, . . . , 1}.
• Baseline case: When i = N , the expected consumer surplus (which equals to the platform
profit by Corollary 3.2) is given by
V cN = V
p
N =
1
α
exp(α(vN − cN )− 1),
which is constant and is weakly increasing in ρ.
• Induction: In period i, i = N − 1, · · · , 1, the expected value is
V ci = V
p
i =
1
α
Pi + ρV ci+1
= 1
α
exp(−α(2ρV ci+1 + ci − vi +
1
α
)) + ρV ci+1,
and
∂V ci
∂ρ
= ∂V
p
i
∂ρ
= (−2ρ) exp(−α(2ρV ci+1 + ci − vi +
1
α
))
∂V ci+1
∂ρ
+ V ci+1 + ρ
∂V ci+1
∂ρ
= ρ
∂V ci+1
∂ρ
[1− 2
e
exp(−α(2ρV ci+1 + ci − vi))] + V ci+1.
By the inductive hypothesis, ∂V
c
i+1
∂ρ is non-negative. In addition, 2ρV ci+1+ci−vi is non-negative
because ci ≥ vi and 2ρV ci+1 is non-negative. Therefore, [1 − 2e exp(−α(2ρV ci+1 + ci − vi))] is
non-negative, which completes the proof.
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Combining this result with corollary 3.2, we have, p∗i = ci + 1α + ρV
p
i+1, where V
p
i+1 is increasing in
ρ. It follows that each product’s optimal price is an increasing function of the consumer patience
parameter ρ.
D Web interface: On the relationship between valuations and
prices within a page
In this Appendix we analyze the profit-maximizing pricing of two products within a single page
(k = 2) to better understand the surprising inverse relationship between prices and expected valua-
tions within a page. As in Section 5, we assume the private valuations are exponentially distributed
with unit mean c1 = c2 = 0. The following Proposition shows that the product with the higher
expected valuation is priced lower.
Proposition D.1 For a profit-maximizing VA, v1 > v2 implies p1 < p2.
Proof : The prices p1 and p2 are set to maximize the seller’s expected profit P1p1 + P2p2, Pi
(i = 1, 2). The probability that the consumer purchases product i is given by
Pi =
∫ ∞
pi−vi
∫ x+vi−pi−vj+pj
0
exp(−(x+ y))dydx
=
∫ ∞
pi−vi
exp(−x)(1− exp(−(x+ vi − pi − vj + pj))dx (4)
= exp(−(pi − vi))− 12 exp(vi + vj − pi − pj).
The first order conditions simplify to
p1 = 1 +
p2
2 exp(p2 − v2)− 1 , and (5)
p2 = 1 +
p1
2 exp(p1 − v1)− 1 . (6)
Equations (5)-(6) imply that p1 is increasing in v2 and decreasing in p2, and that 1 < p1, p2 < 2.
Rearranging (5)-(6), we have
p1 + p2 − 1
p1 − 1 = 2 exp(p2 − v2), and (7)
p1 + p2 − 1
p2 − 1 = 2 exp(p1 − v1). (8)
Dividing equation (7) by equation (8) and rearranging, we get η(p1)η(p2) = exp(−(v1 − v2)) < 1, where
η(p) = p−1exp(p) . Since η(p) is an increasing function for p < 2, η(p1) < η(p2) implies p1 < p2, which
completes the proof.
A more intuitive way of reaching this result is by starting with the case of two products with
equal valuations, v1 = v2, and increasing v1. Obviously, when v1 = v2, p∗1 = p∗2. Now increase v1 to
v′1 > v1. First, notice that this has no direct effect on p1: by equation (7), p1 is not a function of
v1. Raising v1 does increase p2: by equation (8), p2 is an increasing function of v1. Now, increasing
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p2 leads to a decrease in p1: by equation (4), p1 is a decreasing function of p2. We thus moved
from an initial equilibrium with p∗1 = p∗2 to a new equilibrium (p′1, p′2) with p′1 < p∗1 and p′2 > p∗2
(see Figure 8). Thus, prices have moved in the opposite direction to that of expected valuations.
Figure 8: Equation (5)-(6) with different parameters vi. The red and the blue lines correspond to equations
(5) and (6), respectively, when v1 = v2 = 1. The dotted blue line corresponds to equation (6) with v′1 > v1.
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